A New International Division of Labor in Europe: Outsourcing and Offshoring to Eastern Europe by Marin, Dalia
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.gesy.uni-mannheim.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D. · Department of Economics · University of Mannheim · D-68131 Mannheim, 
Phone: +49(0621)1812786 · Fax: +49(0621)1812785 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2005 
 
 
*Dalia Marin, Department of Economics, Ludwigstrasse 28, D-80539 Munich, phone: ++4989/2180-2446, fax: 
++4989/2180-6227. dalia.marin@lrz.uni-muenchen.de  
 
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.
 
Discussion Paper No. 80 
A New International Division of 
Labor in Europe: Outsourcing and 
Offshoring to Eastern Europe 
Dalia Marin* 
 
 
A New International Division of Labor in Europe: 
Outsourcing and Offshoring to Eastern Europe  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dalia Marin 
University of  Munich 
 
 
September 2005 
 
                                 
Abstract 
  
 
Europe is reorganizing its international value chain. I document these changes in Europe’s interna-
tional organization of production with new survey data of Austrian and German firms investing in 
Eastern Europe. I show estimates of the share of intrafirm trade between Austria or Germany on the 
one hand and Eastern Europe on the other. Furthermore, I present empirical evidence of the drivers of 
the new division of labor in Europe. I find among other things that falling trade costs and reduced lev-
els of corruption as well as improvements in the contracting environment in Eastern Europe are affect-
ing the level of intrafirm imports from that region. These factors also favor outsourcing over offshor-
ing. In contrast, low organizational costs of hierarchies and large costs of holdup (when there are no 
alternative investors in Old Europe or no alternative suppliers in Eastern Europe) favor offshoring over 
outsourcing. Tax holidays granted by host countries in Eastern Europe also mildly affect the organiza-
tional choice.    
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1. Introduction 
 
Within the last decade, a new division of labor has emerged in the world economy. The international 
division of labor is characterized by firms geographically separating different production stages across 
the world economy in order to exploit differences in production costs. Thus, firms organize their activ-
ity in a global value chain. With Eastern Enlargement, Europe is reorganizing its international value 
chain. European firms outsource and offshore production to Eastern Europe.  As a result, Eastern 
Europe is becoming an important location for European firms’ international organization of produc-
tion. This paper raises three issues. First, why do firms organize in an international value chain? Sec-
ond, what is the extent of outsourcing and offshoring to the new member states (New Europe), to the 
countries of the next enlargement round (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia), and to the Former Soviet Union 
– in particular, Russia and Ukraine? Third, what determines empirically the level of offshoring and the 
organizational choice between offshoring and outsourcing to Eastern Europe? In addressing these 
questions, the paper makes use of new firm survey data of 660 German and Austrian firms with 2,200 
investment projects in Eastern Europe during the period 1990 to 2001. The new survey data represent 
100% of Austrian and 80% of German direct investment in Eastern Europe.1 
  
 
2. The Organizational Choice: Outsourcing versus Offshoring 
 
Why do firms organize in an international value chain? Firm’s management must decide regarding two 
aspects. First, how much control does it want over the firm’s activity – that is, should the firm produce 
inside or outside of the firm boundaries? Second, where should it locate production, at home or 
abroad? These two decisions lead to the phenomenon of international outsourcing or offshoring. In-
ternational outsourcing is a relocation of activity outside the firm to an independent input supplier in 
New Europe. Offshoring is a relocation to New Europe of activity that remains inside the firm. 
 
The benefit of organizing an activity inside the firm is that headquarters then have more control over 
the activity and stronger incentives to provide headquarter services. The costs of hierarchies, however, 
include the loss of middle management initiative. The benefit of organizing an activity outside the firm 
by outsourcing to an independent input supplier is that it promotes the incentives and initiative of the 
input supplier. However, it does risk the cost of holdup due to incomplete contracting. The firm 
                                                          
1 For more details on the data, see Marin (2004). 
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chooses the offshoring option when the net gain from organizing the activity inside the firm outweighs 
the costs: that is, when headquarter services are more important than the incentives of the input sup-
plier on the one hand and, on the other hand, when reduced initiative on the part of skilled workers is 
less critical than the potential holdup problem. The firm chooses to outsource when the reverse is the 
case. Furthermore, the firm chooses the location with lowest production costs (including wages, trans-
port costs, and the cost of contracting). Hence, a European firm will relocate activity inside or outside 
of firm boundaries to New Europe when unit labor costs there are lower than in Old Europe.2  
 
 
3.  Eastern Europe – A New Member in the International Division of Labor? 
 
How important are outsourcing and offshoring to Eastern Europe? One way to answer this question is 
to look at the pattern of intrafirm trade with Eastern Europe. Table 1 I characterizes the offshoring 
investment of a parent firm in Germany or Austria that is exporting input goods to its affiliate in East-
ern Europe and is also importing these goods back from its affiliate in Eastern Europe after refinement. 
Thus, offshoring investments involve an intrafirm export from the parent firm in Germany or Austria 
to its affiliate in Eastern Europe as well as an intrafirm import from the affiliate in Eastern Europe to 
Germany or Austria. 3 
 
                                                          
2 For the different global sourcing strategies see Antras (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004); for the costs of 
hierarchies in the world economy see Marin and Verdier (2003, 2005); and for the extent of the division of labor 
see Acemoglu et al. (2005).  
3 For different measures of offshoring and outsourcing, see Hummels et al. (2001) and  Hanson et al. (2001).  
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Baltic States 3.11 28.43
Czech Republic 11.73 75.95
Hungary 10.19 27.18
Poland 41.54 14.50
Slovak Republic 9.94 68.71
Slovenia 15.49 12.44
Bulgaria 2.99 71.94
Romania 24.20 63.68
Other SEE 8.46 14.29
Russia 67.90 26.59
Ukraine 16.14 17.11
Other CIS 3.72 49.36
   Austrian   German 
Table 1. Offshoring to Eastern Europe1
CEE 17.12
As % of all FDI2
SEE 12.06
42.11
46.68
55.68
2 Firms' offshoring activities as percentage of all foreign direct investments in respective Eastern European country.
1 Parent firms export intermediate goods as well as import intermediate or final goods from their affiliates in Eastern Europe; A tighter criterion for 
outsourcing requiring that parent firms import at least 20% of their Eastern European affiliates' output (rather than import at all) reduces the German 
multinationals' outsourcing numbers for the Czech Republic to 10%, for Russia to7 %, and for Ukraine to 2 %. All other numbers remain the same.
Source: Chair of International Economics, University of Munich, firm survey of 2,200 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 660 firms.
29.15
Total Eastern Europe 17.27 45.44
CIS
 
 
 
I focus first on Germany. From Table 1 we see that on average about 45% of  German investment to 
Eastern Europe fulfill these criteria and thus constitute offshoring activities of German firms. The im-
portance of offshoring investment is much greater, however, for certain individual Eastern European 
countries. Offshoring dominates among German investment in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slova-
kia, and Romania (a share of about 70%), though it plays little role in Slovenia and Poland. Offshoring 
to Eastern Europe is much less important among Austrian firms: only 17% of Austrian investments to 
Eastern Europe are offshoring investments. Again there is considerable variation across individual 
countries, with 68% of offshoring investment in Russia and 42% in Poland. 4  
 
Finally, the data allow me to calculate for the first time the share of intrafirm trade - international trade 
that takes place inside the multinational corporation between the parent firm (in Germany or Austria) 
and its affiliates in Eastern Europe. These numbers are given in Table 2. It turns out that intrafirm 
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trade with Eastern Europe is a dominant phenomenon in Austria (68.5% of Austria’s imports from 
Eastern Europe are goods from Austrian affiliates in Eastern Europe to their parent firms in Austria, 
and 22.4% of Austria’s exports to Eastern Europe is trade within the multinational enterprise). For 
Germany, however, such intrafirm transactions are a less important part of Eastern European trade 
(only 21.6% of imports from EE and 11.7% of exports to EE are intrafirm trade). The table shows 
considerable variation across individual countries, with a share of 65% of Germany’s imports from 
Slovakia and a share of 34% of its export to Slovakia as intrafirm trade.   
 
Share of intra-firm 
exports in total 
exports to EE 3
Share of intra-firm 
imports in total imports 
from EE 4
Share of intra-firm 
exports in total 
exports to EE 3
Share of intra-firm 
imports in total 
imports from EE 4
CEE
   Baltic states 13.95 n.a. 5.19 14.41
   Czech Republic 19.67 42.17 6.83 15.64
   Hungary 20.03 136,47 5 11.95 40.46
   Poland 41.08 64.91 17.77 15.34
   Slovak Republic 26.11 54.71 34.01 64.98
   Slovenia 18.70 48.36 3.32 9.38
SEE
   Bulgaria 3.36 11.32 2.30 4.20
   Croatia 16.08 40.40 1.78 1.95
   Romania 22.72 57.46 3.86 7.17
CIS
   Russia 34.57 26.70 4.94 1.67
   Ukraine 12.00 21.52 4.51 2.44
Total 22.40 68.52 11.67 21.56
5 Austria's share of of intrafirm imports in total imports from Hungary exceeds 100% owing to one particular large investment for which we could not disentangle goods 
delivered to the parent firm in Austria from those goods delivered to the parent firm in Singapore.
1 For Austria, total trade with Eastern Europe is the average of 1999-2000, since the numbers of intrafirm exports and imports from the firm survey are from these years. 
The survey information on intrafirm exports and imports varied greatly for individual countries in Eastern Europe as a result of missing cases. In order to make the 
intrafirm trade numbers comparable with total trade with Eastern Europe, we artificially reduced total exports and imports by the number of missing cases of intrafirm 
exports and imports for individual Eastern European countries. Exports (resp. imports) from Eastern Europe are reduced by a factor of 0.17 (resp. 0.10) for the Czech 
Republic, by 0.51 (0.39) for Hungary, by 0.26 (0.24) for Poland, by 0.58 (0.30) for the Slovak Republic, by 0.55 (0.20) for Slovenia, by 0.48 (0.47) for Bulgaria, by 
0.38 (0.11) for Croatia, by 0.62 (0.47) for Romania, and by 0.74 (0.62) for Russia. For the Baltic States and for Ukraine, total trade is not reduced because there were no 
missing cases.
4  Intermediate or final goods delivered by Eastern European affiliates to parent firms for marketing or further reprocessing.
3 Intermediate inputs delivered by parent firms to Eastern European affiliates.
2 For Germany, total trade with Eastern Europe is the average of 1996-2000, since the numbers of intrafirm exports and imports from the firm survey are from these 
years. The survey information on intrafirm exports and imports varied greatly for individual countries in Eastern Europe as a result of missing cases. In order to make 
the intrafirm trade numbers comparable with total trade with Eastern Europe, we artificially reduced total exports and imports by the number of missing cases of 
intrafirm exports and imports for individual Eastern European countries. Exports (resp. imports) from Eastern Europe are reduced by a factor of 0.63 (resp. 0.50) for the 
Baltic States, by 0.13 (0.00) for the Czech Republic, by 0.60 (0.40) for Hungary, by 0.87 (0.52) for Poland, by 0.10 (0.00) for the Slovak Republic, by 0.57 (0.35) for 
Romania, by 0.64 (0.34) for Russia, and by 0.75 (0.00) for Ukraine. For Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Croatia, total trade is not reduced because there were no missing cases.
Source: Chair of International Economics, University of Munich, firm survey of 2,200 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 660 firms; Statistik Austria; 
Statistisches Bundesamt.
Table 2. Intrafirm Trade as Percentage of Total Trade with Eastern Europe  
Austria 1 Germany 2
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 The reason for this difference between Germany and Austria is that 56.5% of German offshoring investments 
to Eastern Europe are in the manufacturing sector, whereas for Austria the offshoring is mainly (71.7%) in the 
services sector - in particular in banking and financial services.   
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In sum, the pattern of intrafirm trade that has emerged between Germany and Eastern Europe and be-
tween Austria and Eastern Europe, suggests that some of the Eastern European countries (such as 
Hungary, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Romania, Bulgaria, and Russia) have clearly be-
come new members in the international division of labor.5 
 
 
4. Determinants of Offshoring and Outsourcing 
 
What forces are driving the new international division of labor that is emerging in Europe? Section 2 
briefly summarized the factors determining the choice of organization. The firm will allocate power to 
the headquarter (offshoring) when the headquarter’s supply of services is more important than the 
input supplier’s incentives to deliver a specialized input for a certain price, since the party with control 
captures a larger fraction of the surplus and thus will have greater incentives to supply its own ser-
vices. Moreover, the firm will prefer offshoring to outsourcing when the organizational costs of hier-
archies are less than the costs of holdups due to independent suppliers. The fall of communism and the 
prospect of Eastern Enlargement led to reduced trade costs and levels of corruption as well as to an 
improved contracting environment in the new member states, increasing the attraction of this region as 
a location for European firms’ activities.6  
 
In order to determine the choice of organization in Eastern Europe, I run two types of regressions. 
First, I estimate the determinants of the share of intrafirm imports from affiliates in Eastern Europe as 
a percentage of parent firms’ sales (the level of offshoring) in Austria and Germany; see Table 3. Sec-
ond, I show (in Table 4) probit estimates of the choice between outsourcing and offshoring by German 
firms. As a proxy for the importance of headquarter services, I use the variable R&D as percentage of 
sales of parent firms. The dummy variable Aalternative captures the holdup problem faced by German 
or Austrian investors; the holdup problem is severe when there are no alternative suppliers in Eastern 
Europe for the German investor. Property rights is an alternative measure for the holdup problem and 
captures the effectiveness of contract enforcement in Eastern Europe. Workers’ initiative   is a proxy 
for the organizational costs of hierarchies. As firm decision making becomes less centralized, the costs 
                                                          
5 For the impact of the new international division of labor on the skill premia in Germany and in Austria and 
Poland see (respectively) Marin and Raubold (2005) and Lorentowicz et al. (2005); for its impact on unemploy-
ment in Austria and Germany, see Marin (2004). For the pattern of skill offshoring to Eastern Europe, see Marin 
(2004) and Marin et al. (2003). 
6 Marin and Schnitzer (1995, 2002) and Nunn (2005) show that incentive problems and the contracting environ-
ment also affect the pattern of trade.  
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of organizing an activity inside the firm increase. This will be so, because firms choose a less hierar-
chical organization to avoid the costs of losing the initiative of their skilled workers.7  
 
Starting with the right-hand side of Table 3, for Germany we see that intrafirm imports from Eastern 
Europe are larger [a] when the parent firm is larger, more labor intensive (smaller ratio K/L of capital 
to labor ratio), and more R&D intensive; [b] when organizational costs of hierarchies (more central-
ized decision making by parent firm), transport costs (as measured by distance), and  affiliate/parent 
wage ration are all lower; [c] when contract enforcement is weak in the Eastern European country; and 
[d] when the German firm cannot choose between alternative input suppliers in the host country. 
These results suggest that German firms want to offshore to a low-wage country (and thus intrafirm 
imports are larger) when labor costs matter and transport costs are not too high. The risk of holdup is 
larger in countries with weak contract enforcement, and this increases the costs of organizing the ac-
tivity outside the firm.  The other measure of holdup, Aalternative, appears, however, not to be signifi-
cant at conventional levels, whereas the cost-of-hierarchies variable workers’ initiative is highly sig-
nificant. The other variables suggested by theory – such as the productivity dispersion among German 
firms and ratio of affiliate to parent wages (see Antras and Helpman 2004) – appear not to be signifi-
cant. 
 
The left-hand side of Table 3 summarizes the results for Austrian firms and shows some striking dif-
ferences. Austrian firms do more offshoring when they are less (rather than more) R&D intensive and 
when they are capital intensive rather than labor intensive. This is so even when controlling for the 
fact that Austria’s investments to Eastern Europe are mainly in the banking and financial service in-
dustries. Also, Austrian parent firms import the more from their Eastern European affiliates that are 
more R&D intensive.8 Holdup costs (property rights and Aalternatives, not shown) and organizational 
costs (workers’ initiative) are not significant, but tax holidays granted by the host country and produc-
tivity dispersion among firms both significantly affect the level of Austrian intrafirm imports. 
 
I turn now to the choice of organization between outsourcing and offshoring by German firms; see 
Table 4. To decide between outsourcing and offshoring is to decide on the amount of control the firm 
retains over activity in Eastern Europe. I use the German firm’s control stake in its Eastern European 
affiliate to distinguish between outsourcing and offshoring: “outsourcing” applies when the parent 
firm’s ownership share the Eastern European subsidiary is no more than 30%; “offshoring” applies 
                                                          
7 See Marin and Verdier (2003, 2005) for the reasoning.  
8 These results are consistent with the fact that Austria is “human capital poor” relative to Eastern Europe and 
thus offshores the skill-intensive stages of production to that region (Marin 2004); for the effect of this on the 
skill premium in Austria, see Lorentowicz, Marin, Raubold (2005). 
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when that share exceeds 30%. If the parent’s controlling stake is less than 30%, then any deal between 
parent and affiliate more resembles an arms-length transaction than a transaction within the firm.9  
German outsourcing to Eastern Europe relative to offshoring is more likely when the parent firm is 
more capital intensive and less R&D intensive and when transport costs are larger. These results are 
consistent with the estimates on intrafirm imports in Table 3. Moreover, outsourcing relative to off-
shoring is more likely when the host country has a low level of corruption and when the holdup prob-
lem is mild because the input supplier in Eastern Europe can choose between several alternative inves-
tors from Old Europe. Both factors tend to lower the costs of organizing an activity outside the firm. 
Finally, larger firms (as measured by the number of workers) with larger organizational costs tend to 
favor outsourcing, whereas the most productive firms (relative to the industry average) tend to favor 
offshoring. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 I follow this procedure because I do not have separate data on outsourcing. My data include offshoring invest-
ments with an ownership share of the parent company of between 10% and 100% (fully owned subsidiary). 
Typically, national banks define an offshoring investment as one where the parent firm owns at least 10% – 20% 
of the affiliate’s assets. 
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
log ( K / L )P -0.487 5.407*** -0.276 -0.128 -0.705*** -0.760*** -2.334*** -0.700***
[1.493] [3.008] [0.822] [0.396] [4.269] [4.285] [3.113] [3.932]
log ( R&D / sales )P -1.174*** -1.069 -1.192*** -1.413*** 0.311*** 0.341*** 0.418 0.441*
[4.523] [0.986] [4.177] [4.892] [3.005] [3.305] [0.643] [1.760]
log ( distance ) -0.314 -0.393 -0.455* -0.926*** -1.156*** -1.553*** -0.962***
[1.120] [1.271] [1.663] [3.372] [4.110] [2.683] [2.886]
log ( K / L )A 0.205
[0.493]
log ( R&D / sales )A 1.814*
[2.066]
productivity dispersionp 0.000*** 0.000
[2.864] [0.873]
workers' initiative 0.067 -2.220**
[0.217] [2.186]
log (affiliate wage / parent wage) -0.345
[1.026]
Aalternative 0.653
[0.583]
property rights -0.642***
[3.058]
tax holidays 4.421***
[2.626]
constant -3.294 -64.390*** 0.964 -0.610 13.160*** 18.749*** 22.495*** -343.168
[0.927] [3.297] [0.187] [0.125] [3.592] [4.656] [4.386] [0.847]
industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
observations 192 37 165 191 277 275 77 192
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.63 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.45 0.62 0.45
Dependent variable: log (intermediate imports / parent sales).
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 3. Determinants of German and Austrian Intra-Firm Imports from Eastern Europe
Property rights: enforcement of contracts in the country in Eastern Europe as perceived by the investor, ranging between 1 (weak) and 5 (effective) contract enforcement.
Tax holidays: tax holidays granted by a country in Eastern Europe as ranked by the investor; values range between 1 and 5, where 1 is a tax holiday as a decisive reason to invest in 
Eastern Europe and 5 as an unimportant reason for investment.
Productivity dispersion:                                     where          is firm's  productivity and        as the mean productivity over all firms.
Aalternative: dummy variable equal to 1 when there is no alternative supplier in Eastern Europe for the investor and equal to 0 when there is at least one alternative supplier.
GermanyAustria
Workers' initiative: mean of 16 parent firm decisions (without R&D) including decision on acquisition or hiring a secretary; value ranges between 1 and 5,  where 1 is decision at the 
CEO level and 5 is decentralized decision at the divisional level.
(K / L)P: parent firm's capital-to-labor ratio.
(K / L)A: affiliate firm's capital to  labor ratio.
(R&D / sales)P: R&D expenditures as percentage of parent firm's sales.
Distance: distance in km between parent firm and its affiliates.
(R&D / sales)A: R&D expenditures as percentage of affiliate firm's sales.
λλλ /)( −f irm firmλ λ
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log ( K / L )P 0.124 1.035*** -0.043 1.022***
[1.615] [3.704] [0.523] [3.413]
log ( R&D / sales )P -0.095*** -0.040 -0.379*** -0.232** -0.452***
[2.599] [1.009] [3.290] [2.081] [3.545]
log ( distance ) 0.412** 0.750** 0.608* 0.781**
[2.247] [2.238] [1.897] [2.181]
productivity dispersionp -0.000*** -0.000**
[3.456] [2.070]
corruption 0.443** 0.390**
[2.363] [1.969]
Palternative -0.913**
[2.214]
log ( L )P 0.194*
[1.838]
constant -2.962*** -3.859*** -20.019*** -3.949* -21.608***
[3.576] [2.970] [4.032] [1.724] [3.934]
observations 330 461 205 156 205
Pseudo R2 0.0591 0.1389 0.4104 0.3062 0.4583
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Productivity dispersion:                                         where           is firm's productivity and        as the mean productivity over all firms.
L: number of parent firm's employees.
Palternative: dummy variable equal to 1 when there is no alternative partner for the supplier in Eastern Europe and equal to 0 when there is at least one 
alternative partner.
Corruption: corruption in the Eastern European country as perceived by the investor, ranging between 1 ( pervasive corruption) and 5 (no corruption).
Table 4. Probit Estimate of Choice between Outsourcing and Offshoring among German Firms 
(K / L)P: parent firm's capital-to-labor ratio.
(R&D / sales)P: R&D expenditures as percentage of parent firm's sales.
Distance: distance in km between parent firm and its affiliates.
Absolute value of z-statistics in brackets.
Dummy dependent variable: 1=outsourcing (when ownership share is no more than 30%); 0=offshoring (when owneship share exceeds 30%).  
λλλ /)( −firm λfirmλ
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